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NOT ALL ILLNESSES ARE TREATED EQUALLY -
DOES A DISABILITY BENEFITS PLAN VIOLATE
THE ADA BY PROVIDING LESS GENEROUS LONG-
TERM BENEFITS FOR MENTALLY DISABLED




In 1996, Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico stated, "[a]lthough
we now understand that mental illnesses are, . . . for the most part, physical
illnesses, they are still treated differently than other physical conditions...
[O]nly 2 percent of all individuals with mental illnesses are covered by
insurance which provides benefits equal to the coverage for physical
illnesses."' Now, more than any other time in United States history,
Americans are working longer hours and workweeks, taking less vacation
time, sleeping less, and acquiring more stressful positions and tasks. These
activities contribute directly to many of the mental health problems that
Americans are diagnosed with every year. One of the most recognizable
mental health problems is depression. The late Senator Paul Wellstone of
Minnesota stated in an address to the Senate that "[t]he National Institute of
Mental Health ("NIMH"), a NIH research institute within the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, describes serious depression as
an extremely critical public health problem. ' '2 It was estimated that
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1. 142 CONG. REc. S3588-89 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
2. 147 CONG. REc. S2395 (daily ed. March 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
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"[m]ore than 18 million people in the United States [would] suffer from a
depressive illness" in 2001.3
Another staggering statistic is the NIH's estimation that:
22.1 percent of Americans ages 18 and older-about 1 in 5
adults-suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given
year. When applied to the 1998 U.S. Census residential
population estimate, this figure translates to 44.3 million people.
In addition, 4 of the 10 leading causes of disability in the U.S.
and other developed countries are mental disorders-major
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder.4
Due to the prevalence of these disorders and the disparity between benefits
for mentally disabled persons and those for physically disabled persons,
many will be crippled for weeks, months, or years because their mental
illnesses will go untreated.
If one were told that a long-term disability plan provided different
treatment to individuals with physical disabilities than to individuals with
mental disabilities, one would question this disparity. One might even
think that such a plan was a type of discrimination against people with
mental health problems. This type of disparate treatment has been litigated
before four of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. 5 In each case,
the circuit court has held that none of Titles I, 11, or III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act6 ("ADA") requires an employer-sponsored long-term
disability plan to provide the same level of benefits for mental disabilities
as for physical disabilities.7
Various mental health advocates have observed that:
[T]he disparity between physical and mental illness [is] "the last
bastion of open discrimination in health insurance in this
country." These advocates argue that historical public and
political biases and stigmas associated with individuals suffering
from mental illness are the primary reason for the prevalence of
coverage limitations, and . . . the costs of ending insurance
3. Id.
4. Fact Sheet, Nat'l. Inst. Of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in
America (2001), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfin (citations omitted); see
also Mental Illness in America (Jan. 14, 2000),
http://www.applesforhealth.com/illamerical .html (noting statistics about how the incident of
different mental disorders in America)
5. Lewis v. K Mart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); Rogers v. Dep't of Health &
Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601
(3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). See infra Part
III.
6. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
7. Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (West) 35, 308 (2002).
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discrimination against people with mental illness are minimal and
estimable. . . . [They] maintain that the distinction drawn
between mental and physical [disabilities] for purposes of
insurance coverage is baseless: the limitations are
discriminatory, arbitrary and without sound scientific or
economic basis.8
The disparity in coverage suggests this discrimination should be stopped
and employer-provided mental disability benefit plans should be made
equal to physical disability benefit plans in regards to both treatment and
length of time of the benefits received. One argument in favor of this
notion is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission9 ("EEOC")
has recently recognized that the term "discrimination" in the ADA includes
the prohibition of disparity between mental and physical disabilities. Also,
an argument can be made that an interpretation of the provisions in the
ADA not only prohibit discrimination between the disabled and the non-
disabled, but, in fact, also prohibit discrimination among individuals within
the same protected class. This conclusion is not only supported by a
federal district court decision, but it appears to be sustained by the U.S.
Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.lO
Johnson v. K Mart Corp.," although later vacated, has provided several
persuasive arguments to challenge the disparity between physical and
mental disability benefits. In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit held that: (1)
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C. 2 "stand[s] for the
proposition that the ADA demands more than bust] impartial treatment of
the disabled as compared to the non-disabled"; 3 and (2) a reading of the
Senate and House Committee reports should be interpreted to prohibit a cap
8. Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? - Mental vs. Physical
Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions
From Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the Mental
Health Parity Act and The Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 775-77
(1998) (quoting CB0 Analysis Doesn't Tell Full Story on Mental Health Parity, Coalition
Says, 4 BNA HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP., 908 (May 27, 1996)).
9. Most courts give at least some deference to the Commission's guidelines and
regulations on the ADA. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (noting precedent that EEOC guidelines are properly referred to by courts and
litigants for guidance).
10. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). O'Connor was an age discrimination case in which a
unanimous court held the plaintiff need not show he was discriminated against in favor of
someone outside the protected class, but just that his membership in the class was the cause
of the discrimination, even if the job was awarded to someone else within the class.
11. 273 F.3d 1035 (1 1th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, Id. at 1070. At
rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, declined to render a decision on the merits until K
Mart's bankruptcy petition was disposed by the bankruptcy court. 281 F.3d 1368, 1368
(11 th Cir. 2002).
12. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
13. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1052-53.
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on mental disability benefits because this type of limitation discriminates in
a manner that is prohibited by Section 12112(a) of the ADA.
14
This article will discuss a wide variety of issues, including different
courses of action that the mentally disabled have embarked on to achieve
parity with the physically disabled. Broadly, this article will examine the
courts' failure to extend the necessary protections to individuals suffering
from mental health illnesses. More narrowly, this article will discuss: 1)
the issue of whether former employees have standing to sue their former
employers; 2) some of the negative decisions handed down by the circuit
courts; 3) the EEOC's position on the subject; 4) some alternative paths that
plaintiffs have taken to extinguish the disparity between mental and
physical illnesses; 5) a few of the positive court decisions that, although
never adopted, provide persuasive arguments to dispel the discrimination
and restore parity between the illnesses; and 6) various legislative actions
taken by Congress to achieve parity.
II. STANDING OF FORMER EMPLOYEES TO SUE EX-EMPLOYERS
Many of plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases must first address the
important obstacle that is standing.
In order to have standing to challenge an employer-provided
disability insurance policy as discriminatory under the ADA, a
plaintiff must be a "qualified individual with a disability." The
ADA . . .defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a
person who can perform the essential functions of his or her
position with or without reasonable accommodation.15
"A number of courts have held that a former employee ... lacks standing
to bring suit under Title I of the ADA [because the] employee is not a
'qualified individual with a disability' [if] he or she can no longer perform
the essential functions of the former job."'6 However, other courts have
14. Id. at 1055-56.
15. Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination
Law, 78 OR. L. REv. 27, 61 (1999) (quoting ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
16. Befort & Thomas, supra note 15, at 62; see also Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121
F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that a long-term disability plan offered by an
employer does not discriminate against a former employee in violation of Title I of the ADA
because Title I only applies to employment); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a totally disabled former employee lacks standing to challenge
a company's disability plan that limits benefits only for mentally disabled as discriminatory
under the ADA); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(finding that a former employee maintaining medical coverage under a COBRA plan had no
standing to challenge a limitation of AIDS-related medical expenses as discriminatory under
the ADA).
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taken the opposite view and have permitted former employees to pursue
their ADA claims.17
One of the first courts to address the issue of standing in this context
was the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In EEOC
v. CNA Insurance Cos.," the EEOC attempted to bring an action on behalf
of Cynthia Valladares-Toledo, who suffered from a long-term mental
disability, against her former employer, the CNA Insurance Company
("CNA"). 9 The EEOC "filed a complaint seeking a preliminary injunction
that would require CNA to continue paying benefits to Valladares-Toledo
pending the outcome of the EEOC's investigation" of her claim that CNA's
limitation on mental disability benefits violated the ADA.20 "The district
court denied the requested injunction on the ground that Valladares-Toledo,
and hence the EEOC, had no standing to bring a claim under Title I of the
ADA because Valladares-Toledo did not meet the statutory definition of a
"'qualified individual with a disability."''2' Consequently, the EEOC
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit first defined a "qualified individual with a
disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that [the] individual holds or desires. 22  The court
stated that the question that must be answered is how a person who no
longer is able to hold a position of employment can fit the definition
above. 23 Since Valladares-Toledo was not a current employee, the EEOC
argued that her "'employment position' vis-A-vis CNA [was] . . . that of
'disability benefit recipient.' 24 The court rejected this argument by stating
that an "employment position" is a job and the term "disability benefit
recipient" does not fit within the definition required by 42 U.S.C. §
17. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Provided that
retired employees were qualified ... while employed and on that basis became entitled to
post-employment benefits, the purpose of the 'essential functions' requirement has been
met."); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3rd Cir. 1998) (deciding that
Title I of the ADA allows disabled former employees standing "to sue their former
employers regarding disability benefits so as to effectuate the full panoply of rights
guaranteed by the ADA."); Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1048 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(finding that reading section 12112(a) to exclude former employees would nullify Title I
protections against discriminatory discharge so former employees must have standing),
vacated and reh 'g en banc granted, id at 1070.
18. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. Id. at 1041.
20. Id. at 1041-42.
21. Id. at 1042.
22. Id. at 1043 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (alteration in original).
23. EEOC v. CNS Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. Id.
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121 11 (8).25 The court held that the plain meaning of the statute prevents
Valladares-Toledo from asserting a claim under Title I because "[she] no
longer has an 'employment position' with CNA.
26
Another court that held a former employee is not a "qualified
individual with a disability" was the Eleventh Circuit in Gonzales v.
Garner Food Services, Inc. 27 In this case, August Gonzales, administrator
of the estate of Timothy Bourgeois, filed an action under Title I of the
ADA alleging that the defendants discriminated against Bourgeois by
imposing a cap on his health insurance benefit coverage. 2' Gonzales
appealed soon after the district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit, consistent with the Seventh Circuit, stated
that Bourgeois did not satisfy the requirements of the ADA because "he
neither held nor desired to hold a position with [the defendant] at or
subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory conduct was
committed., 29 Rather, the court believed he was a mere participant in a
health plan.30
In its analysis, the court opined that, "a review of both the ADA and
its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to limit the protection
of Title I to either employees performing, or job applicants who apply and
can perform the essential functions of available jobs which their employers
maintain., 3 Gonzales countered "on the basis that other legislative history
of the ADA, as well as [the EEOC] interpretive guidance, suggest that"
former employees do have standing.32 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and
held that:
Absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the
plain language of the statute should be conclusive.... [W]e find
the plain language of the ADA clearly demonstrates the intent of
Congress to limit the scope of the Act to only job applicants and
current employees capable of performing essential functions of
available jobs. We find no clearly expressed legislative intent
suggesting that former employees . . . should be covered under
25. Id. at 1044.
26. Id. at 1045.
27. 89 F.3d 1523 (1 1th Cir. 1996). It should be noted that this case was overruled by
Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, id. at 1070. Although the Johnson opinion was vacated on other grounds, the
author of this comment believes that the holding that permits a former employee to have
standing will be upheld. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
28. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1524.
29. Id. at 1526.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1527.
32. Id.
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the Act as well.33
Although these cases have prevented former employees from asserting their
claims under the ADA, other courts, such as those in the Second and Third
Circuits, have held that former employees do have standing.
In Castellano v. New York,3 4 several retired New York City employees
brought separate Title I federal disability claims against the City of New
York. These actions were dismissed as "the district court[s] determined
that disabled retirees, who no longer 'hold[]' 'employment position[s]' ...
do not fall within the plain language of the ADA."35  The employees
appealed. The Second Circuit held that such retired employees met the
statutory definition of "qualified employees with a disability" and thus had
standing to claim discrimination in their benefit packages under the ADA.
3 6
The Second Circuit commenced its analysis by stating that 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8) "fails to specify when a potential plaintiff must have been a
'qualified individual with a disability' in the context of a claim that the
provision of retirement or fringe benefits is discriminatory."37 The Second
Circuit stated: "An interpretation that would prevent former employees
who are no longer 'qualified individuals' from bringing claims of
discrimination in the provision of post-employment fringe benefits would.
undermine the plain purpose of sections 12112(a) and (b)(2). 3 8 The
court went on to say that such an interpretation "would also undermine the
ADA's broad remedial purpose to prohibit disability discrimination in all
aspects of the employment relationship, leaving disabled retirees
unprotected from discrimination., 39 In support of this conclusion, the court
cited the 1997 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
40
In Robinson, "[t]he Supreme Court held, consistent with Title VII's text
and broad remedial purpose, that section 704(a) of Title VI 4 ' . . . protects
former employees . . . even though 'former' employees are nowhere
33. Id. at 1528 (citations omitted).
34. 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998).
35. Id. at 66 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing one such district court
case).
36. Id at 68 ("[R]etired employees who receive fringe benefits ... plainly need not
perform the essential functions, or indeed any functions, of their former employment ....
[to] be entitled under the ADA to non-discriminatory treatment in the provision of...
benefits.")
37. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 68. According to the Court, the purpose of those sections is to "provide
comprehensive protection from discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits." ld
39. Id.
40. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
41. This section provides "an antiretaliation provision, which prohibits an employer
from discriminating 'against any of his employees or applicants for employment."'
Castellano v. New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(1994)).
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mentioned in that section., 42 The Second Circuit in Castellano noted that
the holding in Robinson would apply with equal force to the Castellano
case because "the definition of 'employee' under the ADA parallels that
under Title VII and was intended to be given the 'same meaning."'4 3 Thus,
the court held that former employees do have standing to challenge alleged
discrimination under Title I of the ADA.
The Third Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has also held that a former
employee has standing to sue under Title I. In Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp.,44 a former employee brought suit against her employer and
insurance company alleging disparity between disability benefits. Before
addressing the merits of the claim, the court first had to ascertain whether
Ford had standing under Title 1.4' The court noted that the case illustrated
an "internal contradiction in the ADA .... namely the disjunction between
the ADA's definition of 'qualified individual with a disability' and the
rights that the ADA confers., 46  The court went on to say, "[t]his
disjunction ... causes us to view [the definition] as ambiguous rather than
as having an unassailable plain meaning.94 7 The court ultimately held that:
Title I of the ADA does permit disabled individuals to sue their
former employers regarding their disability benefits .... [T]he
ADA's proscription of discrimination in fringe benefits generates
the need for disabled individuals to have legal recourse against
such discrimination and exposes the temporal ambiguity in the
ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability.
48
Moreover, the court reasoned that Robinson and cases dealing with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 49 are relevant as the "ADA is
essentially a sibling statute of Title VII." 5° Thus, the court interpreted Title
I to permit suits by former employees.5'
To add support to the view that former employees have standing, the
Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. K Mart Corp. overturned its previous
decision in Gonzales v. Garner Food Services and held that former
42. Id. at 69.
43. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. at 349 (1997)). There are sections of Title VII
where, in context, the use of the term "employee" refers unambiguously to a current
employee (for example, those sections addressing salary or promotions). See Robinson, 519
U.S. at 343 (discussing sections which permit "different standards of compensation for
'employees who work in different locations"' (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994)).
However, such an exception was not applicable in this case.
44. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 604.
46. Id. at 605.
47. Id. at 606.
48. Id. at 608.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
50. Ford, 145 F.3d at 606.
51. Id. at 608.
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employees do indeed have standing to sue under Title I. However, as
mentioned before, the opinion was vacated and will be re-heard en banc.52
Although the case does not have any binding authority, it does provide
persuasive reasoning in favor of granting standing.
In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in Robinson undermined the Gonzales court's decision that the
meaning of the term "employee" plainly excludes a former employee. In
Gonzales, the Johnson court noted, "the ADA definition of 'employee' was
imported from Title VII, [and] now that the Supreme Court has held that
the term is ambiguous in [the context ofi Title VII, we can no longer
maintain that the term 'employee' unambiguously excludes former
employees in the ADA. 53
The court then turned to the analysis that the Gonzales court used in
defining a "qualified individual with a disability" and declared that the
Gonzales court "relied, without elaboration, on the statutory definition.
5 4
The court also discussed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.," which declared that former employees do not
have standing. In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined "that the use of
the term 'qualified individual' and the use of the present tense forms of the
verbs 'hold' and 'desire' [in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)] reveal congressional
intent to 'unambiguously exclude[ ] totally disabled persons' and 'to
unambiguously exclude former employees.' 5 6 Furthermore, the Weyer
court stated that "the word 'holds' refers exclusively to current employees
and the term 'desires' refers exclusively to applicants. "Thus, the Ninth
Circuit found that ... Title I is 'well designed to help people get and keep
jobs, not to help those no longer able to work get disability pay."'
57
In response, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson stated that the court "in
Gonzales and the Ninth Circuit in Weyer .. . found more clarity in the
language of § 12111(8) than [was] justified."58 The court stated:
Although, "at first blush," the use of the words "qualified" and
"holds or desires" may appear to refer to applicants and current
employees, this initial impression does not withstand the level of
scrutiny required by Robinson, particularly in light of the fact that
at least some former employees were intended beneficiaries of
52. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1070 (1 lth Cir. 2001). See supra notes 11
and 27.
53. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1044.
54. Id. at 1046.
55. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1112) (omission in
original).
57. Id. (quoting Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1112).
58. Id. at 1047.
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Title I59-that is, victims of discriminatory discharge and those
who would benefit from reinstatement.60
Consequently, the court found that the decision in Robinson, "and the
evidence that Title I protects former employees from discriminatory
discharge and provides them the remedy of reinstatement," were enough to
overturn its previous view on the definition of a "qualified individual with
a disability., 61 Thus, the court held that a "former employee, is entitled to
bring a claim against his former employer under ... Title 1.,,62
Although a handful of courts have permitted former employees
standing to assert a claim for the disparate treatment that they receive from
their employers' long-term disability plans, these cases present something
of a Pyrrhic victory. The reason, as will be shown in the next section of
this article, is that most of the circuit courts have held that the ADA does
not require any type of parity between physical and mental disability
benefits.
III. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
The most common avenue that the mentally disabled have traveled is
to argue that the long-term disability plans provided by employers and
administered by carriers violate the ADA by not providing the same level
of benefits for mental disabilities that they do for physical disabilities.
However, nearly all of the circuit courts that have addressed this issue have
held that the ADA does not require the same level of benefits for mental
and physical disabilities.
This section of the article discusses four key circuit court decisions, all
of them holding that: (1) the Supreme Court decisions in Alexander v.
Choate63 and Traynor v. Turnage64 are relevant precedent and are to be
interpreted only to prohibit discrimination between disabled and non-
disabled individuals; (2) the passage of the Mental Health Parity Act proves
that Congress did not intend any sort of parity for individuals within the
protected class (disabled individuals) when it first passed the ADA; (3) the
interpretation of the Senate and House Committee reports of the ADA
support the claim that there is no violation of the ADA when it comes to
59. Title I of the ADA protects employees from discriminatory discharge. See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination of disabled individuals). Title I also
authorizes remedial action, including reinstatement. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (providing
the basis of powers, remedies, and procedures against discrimination on disability).
60. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1047.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1048.
63. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
64. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
2006]
the disparity among the disabilities; and (4) the EEOC's interim policy
manual also supports the finding that the disparity between mental and
physical disability plans does not violate the ADA.
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,65 one of the first cases that dealt with the
disparity of benefits among disabled persons. Ouida Sue Parker
participated in a long-term disability plan66 offered by her employer,
Schering-Plough Health Care Products, Inc. ("Schering-Plough"). 67 During
her employment, Parker became disabled due to severe depression and
received benefits under the plan.68 Pursuant to the terms of the plan,
Schering-Plough terminated her benefits. 69  After many unsuccessful
attempts to get her benefits reinstated, she filed an action alleging
violations of Titles 170 and 11I71 of the ADA. The district court dismissed
both of Parker's claims.7" On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that:
[T]he ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with
different disabilities. Rather, the ADA prohibits discrimination
between the disabled and the non-disabled. . . . Because all
employees . . ., whether disabled or not, received the same access
to the long-term disability plan, neither the defendants nor the
plan discriminated between the disabled and the able bodied.73
In support of this holding, the Sixth Circuit cited Traynor v.
Turnage.74 In that case, the United States Supreme Court examined the
issue of whether a benefit to a certain class of disabled persons and not to
65. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
66. Under this plan, an individual who was deemed to be totally disabled due to a
mental or nervous disorder could receive benefits for up to twenty-four months. However,
for physical disorders, the plan provided for benefits until the individual reached the age of




70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
Many courts have held that "other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" include
long-term disability benefits. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2000) (explaining that the
term "discriminate" includes "participating in a contractual or other arrangement or
relationship" that has the effect of discrimination).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-89 (2000). "Title III of the [ADA] prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation." Parker
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (citation omitted).
72. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
73. Id. at 1015-16.
74. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
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other classes violated the Rehabilitation Act.7 5 Specifically, the Court was
confronted with the issue of whether the "GI Bill, 76 could deny the
plaintiff an extension because the Veteran's Administration concluded that
his alcoholism constituted "willful misconduct."" The Supreme Court
held, "[t]here is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any
benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be extended
to all other categories of handicapped persons. 78 The Sixth Circuit in
Parker interpreted this to mean that the ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act,
only prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled.7 9
The Sixth Circuit continued its analysis in determining that the
defendant's plan does not discriminate by stating that:
[The] passage of the Mental Health Parity Act [of 1996] suggests
Congress believed that the ADA neither governs the content of
insurance policies nor requires parity between physical and
mental illnesses; thus, passage of a law requiring such parity was
required if Congress desired insurance carriers to cease [the
disparity] in insurance policies.8"
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
One of the next cases to deal with this issue was Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp.,81 which came before the Third Circuit. Colleen Ford was an
employee of Schering-Plough and eventually became disabled by virtue of
a mental disorder. During her employment, she participated in an
employee welfare benefits plan82 offered by her employer.83  When her
benefits were exhausted, she filed a complaint against Schering alleging
discrimination in violation of the ADA. 4 The district court dismissed her
claims and she appealed to the Third Circuit, which focused its analysis on
the issue of "whether the disparity between mental and physical disability
75. Id. at 537 (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002)).
76. Veterans' Readjustment Benefit Act of 1966, 38 U.S.C. § 1661 (2000). This bill
provides that the assistance benefits "must be used within ten years following the veteran's
discharge; however, if the veteran was unable to utilize his or her benefits within the ten
year period due to 'a physical or mental disability which was not the result of his or her own
willful misconduct,' the veteran may obtain an extension." Parker, 121 F.3d at 1016 (citing
Traynor, 485 U.S. at 538) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1)).
77. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1016.
78. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 549.
79. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015.
80. Id. at 1018.
81. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
82. This plan, like the one in Parker, provided that benefits for physical disabilities
would continue until age sixty-five so long as the physical disability persisted. As for
mental disabilities, the plan stopped benefits after two years if the employee was not
hospitalized. Id. at 604.
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id.
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benefits violates the ADA."85 The Third Circuit held that:
While the defendants' insurance plan differentiated between
types of disabilities, this is a far cry from a specific disabled
employee facing differential treatment due to her disability.
Every Schering employee had the opportunity to join the same
plan . . . [thus] every Schering employee received equal
treatment. So long as every employee is offered the same plan..
. then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers
different coverage for various disabilities. The ADA does not
require equal coverage for every type of disability; such a
requirement . . . would destabilize the insurance industry in a
manner definitely not intended by Congress when passing the
ADA.86
The Third Circuit stated that its analysis was supported by United
States Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act ("the Act").87 Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge
Robert E. Cowen cited the Supreme Court case Alexander v. Choate88 as
precedent for their decision.89 In that case, the Tennessee Medicaid
program reduced the number of inpatient hospital days that it would pay
for. It was claimed that the reduction would have a disproportionate effect
on handicapped individuals as they require longer inpatient care than non-
handicapped individuals. 90
In response, the Supreme Court held that the limit on inpatient
hospital care was facially neutral and "did not 'distinguish between those
whose coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not."' 9'
The Court's rationale was that the handicapped would not suffer from
discrimination because both classes were "subject to the same durational
limitation. ''92 Just as the Sixth Circuit did in Parker,93 Judge Cowen also
cited Traynor v. Turnage94 as Supreme Court guidance on this issue.95
In further support of its decision, the Third Circuit stated that the cases
that determined that the disparity between disabilities was not a violation of
85. Id. at 604.
86. Id. at 608.
87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002). The Third Circuit stated
that it is permissible for a court to look to the Act for guidance in interpreting the ADA.
Ford, 145 F.3d at 608.
88. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
89. Ford, 145 F.3d at 608.
90. Id. (citing Alexander 469 U.S. at 290).
91. Id. (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302).
92. Id. (quoting Alexander, 496 U.S. at 302).
93. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1016 (1997).
94. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
95. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the ADA were supported by the ADA's legislative history.96 The pertinent
section in support of this interpretation is contained in the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee report which states:
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely
to an individual based on the person's diagnosis or disability.
For example, while it is permissible for an employer to offer
insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or
treatments ... a person who has a mental health condition may
not be denied coverage for other conditions such as for a broken
leg or for heart surgery because of the existence of the mental
health condition.97
In addition, the Third Circuit believed that Congress did not intend for
the ADA to mandate parity due to the defeat of an amendment to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,98 which
would have commanded parity between mental and physical illnesses. 99
The court stated that "[s]uch an amendment would have been unnecessary
altogether if the ADA already required such parity.' °00
Lastly, the Third Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's discussion
in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Companies, when the Seventh Circuit stated
that, "[w]ithout far stronger language in the ADA supporting [parity
between mental and physical disabilities], we are loath to read into it a rule
that has been the subject of vigorous, sometimes contentious, national
debate for the last several years."' 0 ' Consequently, the Third Circuit
affirmed the order of the district court in dismissing Ford's complaint.0 2
In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with
this issue of disparity in the context of Title II of the ADA in Rogers v.
Department of Health & Environmental Control.'°3 Major Rogers was
employed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control ("DHEC") and was a participant in a long-term disability plan1
0 4
sponsored by the State of South Carolina ("the State").'0 5 After Rogers was
diagnosed with a panic-anxiety disorder, he applied for long-term benefits
96. Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
97. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 29 (1989).
98. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
99. Ford, 145 F.3d at 610; See also 104 CONG. REC. S3587-89 (discussing the proposed
amendment and documenting the vote that defeated it).
100. Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
101. Id. at 609 (quoting EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996)).
102. Ford, 145 F.3d at 614.
103. 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
104. Similar to the plans in Parker and Ford, this plan provided for physical disability
benefits until age sixty-five and mental disability benefits for one year. Id at 432.
105. Id.
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under the plan. He began receiving the benefits and when they ended after
one year, he sued claiming that the State's plan discriminated against him
because of his mental disability. 10 6  The district court found that the
disparity in benefits was not wrongful discrimination under the ADA.
107
Consequently, Rogers appealed.
Title II of the ADA "applies to 'public entities,' which include states
and their departments and agencies."10 8 Title II states that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, [1] be
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or [2] be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."'09 In dismissing Rogers' complaint, the
court stated that South Carolina fulfilled the first part of Title II in that
"Rogers was not 'excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
the long-term disability plan ... [as] the State provided the same plan to all
of its eligible employees, and Rogers received his allotted benefits."" 0
The last case to be discussed is the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lewis
v. K Mart Corp."' In 1984, Harold Lewis was hired by K Mart
Corporation ("K Mart")."12 During his employment, he participated in a
long-term disability benefit plan." 3 Over the course of his employment,
Lewis had suffered from severe depression and ultimately, his condition
worsened to the point where he had to take a leave of absence." 14
Lewis initially received his benefits, but they were terminated two
years later as his condition was classified as mental in nature." 5 Sometime
later, Lewis filed an action alleging that K Mart's plan violated Title 1.116
The district court conducted a bench trial and, surprisingly, found in favor
of Lewis, providing: "(1) a declaration that the two-year cap on disability
benefits for employees disabled by mental illness violates Title I ... of the
ADA; and (2) a permanent injunction mandating the continued payment of
monthly benefits ... until he reaches age sixty-five."' 17 Subsequent to this
decision, K Mart filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit." 8
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 433 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994)).
109. Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994)) (emphasis in original).
110. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994)).
111. 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
112. Id. at 168.
113. Id. This plan, like all the others discussed in this article, capped disability benefits
for mental disabilities at two years, but benefits for physical disabilities were stopped when




117. Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 169.
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The Fourth Circuit commenced its holding with the statement that it
had already resolved this question in the context of Title II of the ADA in
Rogers." 9 The court determined that "no material distinction exist[ed]
between Title I... and Title II... of the ADA., 120 As such, the reasoning
in Rogers would equally apply in resolving Lewis and consequently, the
court held that "Title I . . . of the ADA does not require a long-term
disability plan . . . to provide the same level of benefits for mental and
physical disabilities.
121
In summary, the Third, Sixth, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have all held that the ADA does not require long-term disability plans to
provide the same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities.
These courts have determined that even though the Supreme Court has
never specifically ruled on this issue, Alexander and Traynor provide the
basis for supporting the legality of the inequality between the disabilities.
The circuit courts have also determined that the legislative history of the
ADA sustains the notion that Congress never intended the ADA to provide
parity. In essence, the courts are implying that without stronger language
by Congress, they will continue to find that the ADA does not mandate any
type of parity between the disabilities.
IV. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S POSITION
As mentioned in the discussion of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Rogers, the EEOC issued an interim policy guidance manual on the
application of the ADA to disability-based distinctions in employer-
provided health insurance in 1993.22 Generally, this interim policy manual
has dictated that a lower level of benefits for mental conditions is not a type
of distinction that the ADA prohibits.
1 23
The purpose, as set forth in the notice, states that the "interim
enforcement guidance sets forth the Commission's position on the
application of the [ADA] to disability-based distinctions.1 2 4 The pertinent
part of the manual reads:
Insurance distinctions that are not based on disability, and that
are applied equally to all insured employees, do not discriminate
119. Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 431 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Title II of the ADA does not require the state to provide the same level of
benefits for mental and physical disabilities in its long-term disability plan).
120. Lewis, 180 F.3d at 170.
121. Id.
122. See EEOC Notice, No. 915.002 (June 8, 1993), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html (showing that although this is an interim
policy, it has and will remain in effect because it has yet to be rescinded or superseded).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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on the basis of disability and so do not violate the ADA. For
example, a feature of some employer provided health insurance
plans is a distinction between the benefits provided for the
* treatment of physical conditions on the one hand, and the benefits
provided for the treatment of 'mental/nervous' conditions on the
other. Typically, a lower level of benefits are provided for the
treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the
treatment of physical conditions. . . . Consequently, although
such distinctions may have a greater impact on certain
individuals with disabilities, they do not intentionally
discriminate on the basis of disability and do not violate the
ADA.
125
As a result of this interim policy manual, the EEOC initially took the
position that the ADA does not prohibit disparity between mental and
physical disability benefits. This position would only prevent
discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled. Because of the
agency's narrow construction of the ADA insurance provision, it has been
stated that the interim policy is "both a boon for insurers and a substantial
detriment to persons with serious mental illnesses who confront
discriminatory insurance coverage. 1 6 However, it seems that the EEOC
has reconsidered its original stance. Its new position, which will be
discussed in further detail, was revealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals through an amicus curiae brief filed in Johnson v. K Mart Corp
27
and again in Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Company. 28 In Lewis, the
defendants argued that the ADA does not prohibit disparity between mental
and physical disabilities, pointing to the EEOC's position that the health
insurance distinctions between mental and physical illness do not violate
the ADA. 129 However, the district court judge responded, "[t]o the extent
that this was ever the position of the EEOC with regard to disability benefit
plans, it does not appear to be so now."'' 30 Hopefully, with this recent
change in position, the EEOC will issue a final policy guidance manual.
Although courts are not bound by the EEOC's interpretive guidelines,
the guidelines "'do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.""50
3'
Because of substantial deference that courts have accorded the EEOC
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for
Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 63, 81 (1997).
127. 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001).
128. 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1168n.9.
131. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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regulations,"' a final policy manual on the subject could be used to
persuade courts to change their stance and find that the disparity in long-
term benefits is a type of discrimination that needs to cease.
V. OTHER AVENUES USED BY PLAINTIFFS
A. Does the Disparity Between Mental and Physical Benefits Violate the
Equal Protection Clause?
Despite the interim policy manual by the EEOC and the decisions by
many of the circuit courts, plaintiffs have tried other arguments to persuade
the courts to require the same level of benefits for mental and physical
disabilities. One avenue used has been to argue that the distinctions
between mental and physical benefits violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Two
cases have involved plaintiffs who have done exactly this. However, both
were unsuccessful in their attempts to use the Equal Protection Clause to
achieve parity.
The first case was Thompson v. Roberson.'33  Deborah Thompson,
who suffered from Tourette's Disorder, worked as an employee for the
State of Indiana. 134 Initially, she received short-term disability benefits and
then obtained long-term benefits. 135  Under Indiana's benefits plan, an
individual could only receive long-term benefit payments for a maximum
duration of four years. 136 Before the Indiana legislature passed the plan, it
determined that due to the cost and increased chance for fraudulent claims,
it would limit the short-term and long-term benefit period for mental and/or
nervous disabilities to a maximum period of twenty-four months.
137
Because of this limitation, Thompson sought a declaration of
unconstitutionality regarding the benefit program.
138
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
began its analysis by setting forth the appropriate standard for an equal
protection violation. The court determined that "[d]isabled individuals-
including the mentally disabled-are not members of a suspect class,"'
139
132. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998); Francis v. City of
Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 283 n.l (2d Cir. 1997).
133. No. THO0-099-C-MIH, 2000 WL 33281120 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 4,2000).
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *1-*2.
138. Id at *4.
139. Thompson v. Roberson, No. THOO-099-C-M/H, 200 WL 33281120, at *5 (S.D.
Ind., Dec. 4, 2000). In support of this assertion, the Court notes that "mentally retarded
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thus, the rational basis standard was the most appropriate standard of
review. 140
To support their positions, both parties cited Geduldig v. Aiello."4 "In
Geduldig, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a California
[benefits] program that . . . excluded certain disabilities resulting from
pregnancy. 142 The Supreme Court of the United States held that there was
no violation of the Equal Protection Clause by stating:
We cannot agree that the exclusion of [certain] disabilit[ies] from
coverage amounts to invidious discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause .... This Court has held that, consistently with
the Equal Protection Clause, a State 'may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind .... The Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all."1
43
The State of Indiana contended that "because all state employees
receive[d] the same benefit package and the same coverage, there simply
[was] no disparate treatment whatsoever."'' 44 The court agreed, holding that
the plaintiffs "were not denied eligibility in the program because of their
mental disabilities; instead, they happen[ed] to suffer from a condition that
[was] outside the state program's protection ... [and, thus, did not have] a
valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
' 145
Moreover, the court remarked that even if they accepted the plaintiffs
argument, it would not end their inquiry as a "'State [may] single out the
disabled for different treatment so long as it has a rational or legitimate
purpose."", 146 In conclusion, the court declared:
Indiana's desire to control its costs and to control the expenditure
of public funds is a rational basis for its classification scheme....
[This] court cannot hold legislation in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause simply because it believes a better solution
exists. Whether the State should provide longer coverage for
mental disabilities is the type of policy judgment that the Court
persons, a subset of the disabled class, [are] neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class." Id.
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).
140. Thompson, 2000 WL 33281120, at *5. The rational basis standard is defined to
"uphold a law as valid under the Equal Protection Clause if it bears a reasonable relationship
to the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective." Black's Law Dictionary
1269 (7th ed. 1999).
141. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
142. Thompson, 2000 WL 33281120, at *6.
143. Id. (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-95) (internal citations omitted).
144. Id. at *7.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *8 (quoting Stevens v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 738-39 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
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simply is not allowed to impose under rational basis scrutin7 .
Instead, such decisions are entrusted to the Indiana legislature.
4
A second case dealing with the Equal Protection Clause is Currie v.
Group Insurance Commission.1 48 This case involved a class action suit
brought by Valjeanne Currie "alleging that the [Group Insurance
Commission]'s Long Term Disability ("LTD") policy violate[d] her
constitutional . . . rights.' 49  Starting in 1985, Currie worked for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.' In 1999 she was forced to leave work
long-term as she suffered from schizophrenia.' 5' She applied for long-term
disability benefits and was eventually notified that her long-term benefits
would cease after one year if she were not hospitalized. 5 2 She filed suit,
and a preliminary injunction to continue the benefit payments was ordered
by the state Superior Court.'5 3
In hearing the case, the United States District Court for
Massachusetts began its analysis of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims by
stating that "[t]he touchstone [of the case was whether there was a] rational
relationship between the underwriting decisions made and the legitimate
ends that were sought."' 154 In essence, the heart of the "plaintiffs' equal
protection claim [was] that... the plan treat[ed] as unequal those mentally
disabled patients who [were] committed to an institution and those who
[were] treated on an outpatient basis".'55 In response, the court held:
[T]here is strong evidence that the disputed limitations of LTD
coverage for mental disabilities are rationally related to the goal
of protecting the program's overall viability. Additionally, it is
certainly true that maintaining a workable disability plan for the
Commonwealth's employees, accomplished in part by keeping
premiums at an affordable level, is a legitimate state interest.
Therefore . . . defendants have not set up a system of
administering disability benefits that violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
56
B. Classifying a Mental Disability as a Physical Disability
Another avenue, which has recently been successful in the court
147. Id. at *9.
148. 147 F. Supp.2d 30 (D. Mass. 2001).
149. Id. at 31.
150. Id. at 32.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 33.
153. Id.
154. Currie v. Group Ins. Conm'n, 147 F.Supp. 2d, 30, 38 (D. Mass. 2001).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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system, has been to either classify a mental disability, such as bipolar
disorder, as a physical disability, or to argue that the term "mental illness"
is ambiguous as used in a given policy. This technique would then allow
an individual to receive benefits equal to those of individuals who have a
physical disability instead of having the benefits capped. When a policy is
ambiguous on its face, courts have concluded that some mental illnesses do
fall outside the definition in the policy and have thus treated those illnesses
as physical disabilities.'57
One case that dealt with a reclassification of a disability was
Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe.5 ' John Doe and his minor
daughter were insured under a group health insurance policy issued by his
law firm. 59 Although the group policy provided broad benefits for
physical illnesses, it limited coverage for mental conditions.160 The policy
did not define mental or physical disabilities. "[Doe's] daughter was
hospitalized and treated for ... bipolar affective disorder."' 16 ' Doe sued for
recovery of the full policy benefits for physical illnesses since his
daughter's treating psychiatrist stated that the disorder was physical. 62 The
Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated, "[w]e agree with the trial court that
the issue for its determination was whether bipolar affective disorder is a
physical illness or a mental or psychiatric condition within the terms of the
policy.' 63 The trial court found that, "'the illness of Jane Doe is a physical
condition within the meaning of the Blue Cross contract' and not a mental
one," and the appeals court would not disturb such a finding.'
64
A second case, dealing with ambiguous terminology, is Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co. 165 In this case, Benefit Trust administered
a plan that limited payment of medical benefits for mental illnesses to
$10,000 per calendar year. 166 "Kunin's son . . .received treatment for
157. See, e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 314 (7th Cir. 1992)
(upholding summary judgment in favor of insured on grounds that the term "mental illness"
was sufficiently analogous to include organic brain syndrome); Akins v. Washington Metro
Area Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that policy is ambiguous
and appears to cover mental disabilities that are caused by physical injury, which included
depression following a stabbing heart surgery); Malerbi v. Cent. Reserve Life of North
America Ins. Co., 407 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Neb. 1987) (affirming trial court's determination
that organic brain syndrome was not a mental illness for purposes of insurance policy when
the policy does not define mental illness).
158. 733 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. at 430.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 431.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 432.
164. Id. (citing the lower court opinion).
165. 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
166. Id. at 535.
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autism for approximately thirty days ... [in which he] incurred $54,696.96
in hospital bills."'167 Benefit Trust refused to pay any amount in excess of
the $10,000.168 The Ninth Circuit determined that the term "mental illness"
as used in the policy was ambiguous, at least with respect to autism.1
69
Accordingly, the court invoked the rule of contra proferentem17' and
construed the ambiguity against the insurance company. 17' Therefore, the
court upheld the trial court's determination that autism was not a mental
illness for purposes of the policy and, in doing so, required the insurer to
pay for the treatment of autism in full. 172 In reaching this decision, the
court relied heavily on the testimony of the Kunins' expert witness who
"testified that 'mental illness' refers to 'a behavioral disturbance with no
demonstrable organic or physical basis.""
173
More recently, the holding in Fitts v. Federal National Mortgage
Ass'n, 74 was so significant that it was a headline in the Wall Street
Journal. 175 In 1995, after Fitts was diagnosed with a bipolar disorder, she
applied for disability benefits. 176 The policy defined mental illness as a
"mental, nervous or emotional disease[ ] or disorder[ ] of any type."'177 Fitts
was informed that she would only receive benefits for twenty-four months
because of her mental illness. 78  After the defendants rejected her
challenge to the administration of payments, she filed suit claiming the
Federal National Mortgage Association violated the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).'79
In her complaint, Fitts maintained that her disorder was physical in
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 541.
170. This term is used in connection with the construction of written documents to the
effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most strongly against the persons who
selected the language. Black's Law Dictionary 327 (6th ed. 1990). On this issue, the court
stated that, "[i]nsurance contracts generally spell out in inordinate detail the meaning of
terms that lack a fixed meaning. Great efforts are ordinarily made to eliminate the natural
ambiguity that exists in so many of the words and phrases we use daily. In this policy,
however, Benefit Trust made no attempt whatsoever to describe the scope of a term that has
no precise or generally accepted definition," Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d
534, 541 (9th Cir. 1990).
171. Kunin,910F.2dat539.
172. Id. at 541-42.
173. Id. at 536.
174. 191 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2002).
175. Michael Orey, Bipolar Disorder Is a Physical 11l, U.S. Judge Rules. WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 2002, at B1, B4 (reporting on the court's ruling on the case).
176. Fitts, 191 F. Supp.2d at 69.
177. Id (omissions in original)..
178. Id.
179. Id.
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nature. 80 She argued, with the support of her expert witness, "that that she
[was] genetically predisposed to develop bipolar disorder because both her
father and brother showed symptoms . . . . [and that] brain scans
indicat[ed] that the parietal lobe on the left side of her brain ha[d] atrophied
beyond what would be expected of a person of her age."' 18 It was these
physical changes that took her bipolar disorder out of the realm of a mental
disability.' 82 To counter this, the "[d]efendants argue[d] that bipolar
disorder plainly qualifies as a 'mental, nervous, or emotional disease or
disorder of any type,"' and that treatment with psychotropic drugs is
evidence that bipolar disorder is a mental illness.'83
After hearing these arguments, the district court stated that
"[d]efendants' argument was without merit because the . . .definition
merely re-phrases the term mental illness by using equally vague terms.' 84
"In sum . . . [w]hile mere disagreement does not suffice to create
ambiguity, the lack of consensus on the meaning of mental illness and the
prevalence of different definitions for the term indicate that more than one
reasonable interpretation of the term exists.' 85 Accordingly, the court held
the definition was ambiguous and Fitts was "entitled to judgment on her
ERISA claim."'
18 6
Even though this case, and other cases like it, has enjoyed a courtroom
victory in the battle for long-term disability benefits, the reality of this
newfound success will eventually catch up with it. Professor Brian
Shannon of the Texas Tech University School of Law summed up this
reality by stating: "Because insurance policies are creatures of contract
law, insurers may simply react to adverse court decrees by amending their
policies to assure the continued discrimination against persons suffering
from serious mental illnesses."'87 Professor Shannon believes these policy
amendments would not only set forth specific exclusionary language to
limit coverage, but also provide a clear and unambiguous definition of what
constitutes a mental illness. 188
180. Id. at 70.
181. Id.
182. Fitts v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage, 191 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2002)
183. Id. at 71.
184. Id. at 74.
185. Id. at 77.
186. Id.
187. Shannon, supra note 126, at 76.
188. Id.; see also Paul S. Applebaum, Litigating Insurance Coverage for Mental
Disorders, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 993, 994 (1989) (discussing the insurers'
amendment of the definitions of mental disorders).
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VI. FAVORABLE DECISIONS FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED
As was done in Parker, Ford, Rogers, and Lewis, plaintiffs will most
frequently argue that the disparity between mental and physical disabilities
violates Title I, II, or III of the ADA. However, as explained in Part II of
this article, virtually every decision has held that the ADA does not
mandate parity. Although most courts have followed the current trend of
the Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits, a few have disagreed and provided
very persuasive arguments to the contrary. These arguments include a
conflicting interpretation of the legislative history on the ADA and citation
to a Supreme Court opinion that seems to prohibit discrimination against
disabled members of a class. One example of a deviation from the current
trend is the district court decision in Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. "9
In this case, United States District Judge Brinkema held that "the
ADA prohibits K Mart from offering a 'qualified individual with a
disability' disability benefits that discriminate on the basis of that
disability,"' 9°and that "an insurer may not provide different levels of
coverage for mental, as opposed to physical, disabilities, unless such
classification is grounded on sound actuarial principles."' 9' Judge
Brinkema determined:
Both a decision to deny coverage on the basis of mental disability
and to provide inferior coverage for mental disabilities target the
mentally disabled for inferior treatment. In both cases, an insurer
has subjected the mentally disabled individual to treatment
inferior to that accorded to others solely on the basis of that
individual's disability. . . . Defendants' attempt to categorize
such discrimination as discrimination between categories of
disability rather than discrimination between the disabled and the
non-disabled fails here. Under [the] defendants' logic, an
employer could hire an employee with a physical disability over
a more qualified employee with a mental disability solely
because of the mental disability without violating the ADA,
simply because both applicants were members of the protected
class.
• ..[T]he ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of an
individual's particular disability. Thus, whether a disabled
person is treated differently than a non-disabled person or
another disabled person, the same wrong has occurred. That is,
the person has been discriminated against because of his
189. 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.Va. 1997). This is the trial court decision of the previously
analyzed Fourth Circuit case, Lewis v. K Mart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); see
supra notes 109 to 119 and accompanying text.
190. Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1161.
191. Id. at 1169.
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particular disability."'
' 92
Judge Brinkema noted that such a holding was supported and affirmed
within the context of age discrimination in the Supreme Court decision of
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.1 93  Judge Brinkema
explained:
"The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as
he has lost out because of his age." . . . [T]he [Age
Discrimination in Employment Act] "does not ban discrimination
against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans
discrimination because of their age, but limits the protected class
to those who are 40 years or older." Similarly, the ADA must be
construed to prohibit discrimination against individuals based on
their specific disability, and not merely to prohibit discrimination
that negatively affects the disabled as a class.
194
In essence, it has been argued that if an "individual receives benefits
for a shorter period of time because her disability is a mental disability
versus a physical disability, she has 'lost out' because of her disability and
should have a claim" under the ADA.' 95  This conclusion and
corresponding analysis is compelling because the ADA was created to
protect persons with disabilities and prohibit the discrimination that can
arise because of such a disability. Such a conclusion only furthers
"Congress' goal to 'bring individuals with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American life.""
196
A second case to disagree with the trend of the circuit courts was
Johnson v. K Mart Corp.'97 This case was significant because the holding
by the Eleventh Circuit was the first of its kind within the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. On November 21, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the denial of disability benefits because an individual is mentally disabled
192. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added); see also Conners v. Me. Med. Ctr. 42 F. Supp. 2d 34,
54-55 (D. Maine 1999) (making note of the Lewis court decision that the ADA prohibits
discrimination among the disabled as well as between the disabled and non-disabled in
contrast to other decisions).
193. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
194. Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1168-69 (emphasis added) (citing O'Connor, 517 U.S. at
311).
195. Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of
Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L.
REv. 361, 377 (1998).
196. Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1169 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-45, pt.2, at 99 (1990)).
197. 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, id. at 1070. In
2002 the circuit court declined to rehear the case until the bankruptcy court disposed of K
Mart's bankruptcy petition. 281 F.3d 1368, 1368 (1 ith Cir. 2002). As of January 2006, a re-
hearing has not taken place. See supra note 11.
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is a type of discrimination that is prohibited by the ADA.198 It should be
noted that this decision was short-lived, as the court vacated the opinion
and granted an order requiring a rehearing en banc on December 19,
2001.'99 Even though the court has yet to re-hear this case, the initial
monumental holding has provided hope for those who have been denied
benefits for their mental health disabilities. Because of the persuasive
arguments set forth in the decision, this case will be discussed in detail. In
fact, a federal district court in Massachusetts found its logic to be worth
considering in its own decision on the subject.200
In the Johnson case, Mr. Johnson worked for K Mart and sometime
during his employment, he was diagnosed with severe depression and
emotional illness.201 His physician soon advised him to stop working and
he then began to receive long-term disability benefits from K Mart.202
Shortly before his benefits ended, Johnson filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC and was issued a right-to-sue letter. He then filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida in February 1999.203 K Mart filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted by the district court. Johnson then filed a timely appeal.20 4
The Eleventh Circuit started its analysis with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a),
the general anti-discrimination provision of Title 1.205 Next, the court
reviewed the amicus curiae brief filed by the EEOC. In reversing its initial
position, the EEOC contended that the district court in this case erred by
arguing that K Mart's long-term disability plan was discriminatory because
"it precludes disabled individuals with mental illnesses from obtaining
benefits that are available to all other disabled individuals. 20 6 In support of
its position, the EEOC argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v.
L. C.207 "made [it] clear that the concept of discrimination embodied in the
198. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1056.
199. Id. at 1070.
200. Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2004) (holding that
disparity of benefits provided for mental and physical disabilities could violate the ADA if
motivated by stereotypes about mental disability).
201. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1037
202. Id. These benefits came from K Mart's long-term disability plan, which provided
benefits to employees who were disabled due to a physical illness until age sixty-five,
whereas an employee who had a mental illness could only receive benefits for two years. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1038.
205. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C § 12112 (1990).
206. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1051.
207. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). In this case "two mentally ill women were housed in a
Georgia state psychiatric hospital. They sued state officials because the refusal to transfer
them from the institutional setting to community-based treatment programs violated Title II
of the ADA. They contended that they would have a greater opportunity to interact with
non-disabled individuals. When the case came before the Eleventh Circuit, the court
specifically rejected Georgia's contention that the ADA only prohibits discrimination
[Vol. 8:4
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ADA encompasses differential treatment of one disabled individual as
compared to another disabled individual. '208 As discussed before, it is this
newly publicized position that exhibits the change in the EEOC's stance. K
Mart countered the EEOC's argument by stating that Traynor and
Alexander, rather than Olmstead, are the pertinent precedents.2°9  The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that although Olmstead arose under Title II, that
case controlled their understanding of the concept of discrimination
embodied in Title 1.210 Thus, the court found that the ADA demanded more
protection than merely that against discrimination between the disabled and
non-disabled.21'
The Eleventh Circuit finished its analysis by addressing whether the
ADA's legislative history would protect what otherwise would seem to be
discrimination.21 2 In doing so, the court analyzed the relevant sections of
the reports from the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, the
House Judiciary Committee, and the House Education and Labor
Committee.2 3 In interpreting these reports, the court stated:
The Committee Reports suggest no intention to interfere with
insurance arrangements which set caps on "procedures or
treatments" that apply to persons with or without disabilities. But
we are here dealing not with a limitation on procedures and
treatments equally available to all but a limitation on
compensation in lieu of salary which is expressly contingent on
what kind of disability has caused a former employee to lose his
job .... Instead of limiting insurance coverage for a particular
type of procedure or treatment, the K Mart plan, on its face,
limits [disability benefits] for those with a specified type of
disability.... Denial of that benefit on the express ground that
the claimant is mentally disabled is discrimination of a sort
prohibited by § 12112(a). 
14
As a result of this in-depth analysis, the court concluded that the ADA
prohibits the disparity between mental and physical disability benefits.
One of the most recent cases providing a favorable decision for the
between the disabled and the non-disabled. Instead, the court focused on whether the
confinement was "attributable to" the plaintiffs' disabilities. In sustaining the Eleventh
Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court likewise concluded that the ADA demands more than
like treatment of the disabled and the non-disabled." Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1051 n. 10.
208. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1051.
209. Id. at 1052.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1053.
212. Id.
213. See supra Part III of this Article for a discussion of the relevant portion of this
report. The other reports used language nearly identical to that of the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee report.
214. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1055-56 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
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mentally disabled is Iwata v. Intel Corp.215 In this case, Jeanne Iwata was
diagnosed with major depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome. She
first applied for, and eventually began receiving, short-term disability
benefits. When they expired, she applied for long-term disability." 6 Her
company denied her application citing the plan's limitation of benefits for
the mentally ill.217  She subsequently filed suit alleging her plan
discriminated against persons with mental health disabilities.
218
The court focused its attention on the core issue of whether the ADA
prohibits a limitation of benefits as between the mentally and physically
disabled.2 19 In its analysis, the court reviewed most, if not all, of the circuit
court cases on this subject and conceded that they all have held that there is
no such prohibition. However, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Johnson contains the strongest argument any court has made to
the contrary.220 Interestingly enough, the court felt the logic of the Johnson
opinion was worth considering despite its vacation and questionable
precedential authority. 221 Thus, the court thoroughly reviewed and agreed
with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis determining that Title I of the ADA
does prohibit discrimination among classes of the disabled 2  In reaching
its decision, the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's ruling in
Olmstead.223 In addition, the court found that some of the main bases that
many of the circuit courts cited as authority, such as the ADA's legislative
history and Congressional action after the passage of the ADA, were, at
best, neutral and could cut in either direction on the issue.224 In its closing




219. Iwata brought suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has stated in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
91 (1983) that ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits and
does not proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits, the district court's
analysis did not stop there. ERISA and federal civil rights laws such as the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act must coexist peacefully, and if Iwata could establish that the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act renders the allegedly discriminatory term in the Plan unenforceable, then
she would be able to invoke the equitable remedy of striking the offending term in the plan.
Iwata, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
220. Iwata, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 149.
223. The Massachusetts district court found the Supreme Court's statement in Traynor
that "nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any benefit extended to one
category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other categories of handicapped
persons" to be dicta. Id. (quoting Traynor, 485 U.S. at 549). Furthermore, the district court
also noted that Olmstead was decided after Traynor and if its interpretation of Olmstead was
correct, then that decision had abrogated Traynor. Id.
224. Id. at 150-54.
NOT ALL ILLNESSES ARE TREATED EQUALLY
thoughts, the court shrewdly recognized the complexity of this area of the




Despite numerous attempts by plaintiffs to have the court system
cease the discrimination between mental and physical disability benefit
plans, most of the efforts have been to no avail. Therefore, it would seem
that Congress must act to permit mentally disabled individuals to obtain
parity. This section of the article will look into past and present attempts
by members of Congress to achieve parity between physical and mental
disabilities. Specifically, the history behind the Mental Health Parity Act
will be discussed along with the original Mental Health Equitable
Treatment Act. In addition, the 2003 and 2005 Senator Paul Wellstone
Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act will be reviewed. Finally, it will
be shown that cost, the main reason that legislators have opposed parity, is
not as significant as insurers and employers argue it to be. In fact, the costs
of untreated or under-treated mental illnesses pose a bigger problem than
rising premiums for employers.
A. Mental Health Parity Act
Since the early 1990s, Congress has passed very few bills that deal
with the disparate treatment persons with mental illnesses face. However,
it was the 104th Congress that took several major measures to introduce
some form of mental health parity. The most notable action was the 1996
Domenici-Wellstone Amendment,226 which was designed to require health
plans to have the same lifetime caps or annual limits on mental illness
benefits that they have for medical or surgical services.227 The amendment
was passed in the Senate by a unanimous voice vote on April 18, 1996.28
However, the amendment slowed due to a debate regarding the potential
cost of such parity and eventually the sponsors retreated to a less
comprehensive measure. 229 By the time Congress completed its work on
the final bill; House-Senate conferees had eliminated the parity
amendment. 3 °
225. Id. at 158.
226. This amendment was named for the co-authors of the bill, Senator Pete Domenici
(R-NM) and late Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN).
227. E-mail from Paul Wellstone, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, to the author while a
student at Duquesne University School of Law (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with author).
228. Gold, supra note 8, at 780.
229. Id.
230. Shannon, supra note 126, at 99.
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Determined to improve mental health coverage, Senators Pete
Domenici and Paul Wellstone introduced an initiative called the Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996 ("MHPA"). 23' After some discussion and a few
slight changes in the coverage provisions, the Act was passed by both the
Senate and House and signed by President Bill Clinton on September 24,
1996.232
The core of the MHPA required annual and aggregate lifetime dollar
limits for mental health coverage to equal those for physical health
coverage in group health plans.233 However, as most proponents would
agree, the MHPA, in large part, did not aid in the fight against the disparity
those with mental disabilities were facing. The main reason, as set forth by
some, stemmed from the fact that the Act did not govern any terms or
conditions relating to mental health benefits other than lifetime caps or
annual limits. 234 Therefore, there were various ways that employers could
circumvent the Act. As author Maggie Gold has pointed out, "[A]n
employer's health plan could cover up to a certain percentage of the costs
of mental health care, even though the plan might cover a higher
percentage of the cost of physical care. 235 In addition, she stated that "an
employer could maintain an insurance plan that covers physical
impairments but provides no mental health benefits at all. 236 All in all, the
MHPA was not an effective tool in eradicating the disparity between
treatment of mental and physical disabilities.
B. Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act
On September 30, 2001, the MHPA expired, as it was sanctioned for
only five years. The current law then reverted back to not providing the
mentally disabled any protection at all. In an effort to address this problem,
Senators Domenici and Wellstone introduced the Mental Health Equitable
Treatment Act of 2001 ("MHETA") 237. As Senator Wellstone stated:
This bill seeks to ensure greater parity in the coverage of mental
health benefits by prohibiting a group health plan from treating
mental health benefits differently .... It is patterned after the
mental health benefits offered through the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) .... Like FEHBP, MHETA
provides full parity for all types of mental illness and does not
231. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2044 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
232. Gold, supra note 8, at 781.
233. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5 (2005).
234. Gold, supra note 8, at 783.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 784.
237. Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, S. 543, 107th Cong. (2001).
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discriminate by diagnosis.
238
In 2001, the Senate voted to include MHETA as an amendment to the
Fiscal Year 2002 Labor-Health and Human Services-Education
appropriations bill.239 However, the amendment was not included in the
House version of the bill and, eventually, the bill was rejected by the House
Republican conference members. 240 Instead, a one-year continuation of the
1996 MHPA was enacted.241
In 2003, there were new efforts by both the House and Senate to
equalize coverage for mental health benefits. H.R. 953, introduced by
Representatives Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island and Jim Ramstad of
Minnesota, and S. 486, introduced by Senators Pete Domenici of New
Mexico and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, were bills that indicated
willingness on the part of Congress to mandate parity in coverage.242
Collectively, the Acts were called the "Senator Paul Wellstone Mental
Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2003," in memory of the late Senator
Paul Wellstone, a leader in the fight for equal access to mental health
treatment and benefits until his tragic death in 2002.
The Act was sought to prevent group health plans from imposing
treatment limitations or financial requirements on mental health benefits
unless comparable limitations were imposed on medical and surgical
benefits. Moreover, the Act clearly defined mental health disorders and no
longer left these definitions open to interpretation by employers, insurers or
the courts. Although it was a clear improvement over the MHPA, the Act
did have some significant limitations. First, the bill did not require a group
health plan or health insurance coverage offered in connection with the
plan to provide coverage for specific mental health services, except to the
extent that the failure to do so would result in disparity between the
coverage of mental health and medical and surgical benefits. The bill also
had a small-employer (less than fifty employees) exemption and only
applied to private health benefit plans.
Despite these limitations, numerous groups, including the American
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the
American Academy of Pediatrics, agreed that actions like this Act were
238. E-mail from Paul Wellstone, supra note 227.
239. Id. See also Mental Health Parity Timeline,
http://www.nmha.org/state/parity/parityTimeline.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2005)
(introducing the process of the adoption and drop of MHETA in 2001).
240. E-mail from Paul Wellstone, supra note 227.
241. Id.
242. For a complete copy of both bills, visit Senator Paul Wellstone Mental Health
Equitable Treatment Act of 2003, H.R. 953, 108th Cong. (2003) and S. 486, 108th Cong.
(2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/bills/search.html (choose "108 Congress
(2003-2004)" in the left window, and type "H.R.953" or "S.486" on the right blank; then
click "submit").
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needed to ensure fair mental health coverage. However, these bills were
visited in various congressional committees and no action was scheduled
for the passage of the Act. Specifically, the bills became "stuck" in
committees because of concerns about driving up health care coverage
costs.
243
Most recently, the same players in the House of Representatives who
introduced the 2003 Act introduced an exact twin, named the Paul
Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2005.24 After it was
introduced, the bill was then immediately referred to both the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Energy
and Commerce.245 In April of 2005, the bill was sent to the House
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations and the Subcommittee on
Health.246
C. Cost of Parity
Whether it is the Domenici-Wellstone Amendment, the MHPA, the
MHETA or the Senator Paul Wellstone Act, the most debated issue centers
on the cost of parity. Many state that "[c]overage for mental illness is
generally subject to higher deductibles and co-payments [and] lower limits
on the number of covered visits . . . than those for physical illnesses.,
247
Furthermore, insurers have maintained cost containment as the most
substantial justification for the lack of parity in insurance coverage.2 8 In
most cases, insurers and employers believe that "[b]y declining to cover
mental illnesses or covering them only up to a minimal level . . . they can
hold down costs and maintain premium levels and services to other
[customers]; thus, granting health care access to a greater number of
people. 249 In support of this position, a study was conducted and prepared
for the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans which estimated
that parity, just for serious mental illnesses would "increase total health
plan expenses between 8.4 and 11.4 percent.5
250
243. See Iwata, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (citing 150 Cong. Rec. S5731 (statement of Sen.
Tom Daschle)).
244. Paul Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 1402, 109th
Cong. (2005).
245. Bill Summary and Status for the 109th Congress, H.R. 1402 (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (type "H.R. 1402" and click "search" button; then follow "Bill
Summary & Status" hyperlink; then follow "All Information" hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
12, 2005).
246. Id
247. Gold, supra note 8, at 773 (internal citations omitted).
248. Id. (internal citations omitted).
249. Id. (internal citations omitted).
250. See Shannon, supra note 126, at 92 (citing ACTION CENTER FOR QUALITY HEALTH
CARE, Ass'N OF PRIVATE PENSION AND WELFARE PLANS, THE COSTS OF UNIFORM PLAN
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It is undeniable that parity for the treatment of mental illness in health
plans will cost insurers more. However, the cost of parity in actuality is not
as expensive as some believe. Senator Domenici observed that "' [i]f it was
done across the board in all policies, [parity] would add about 1.6 percent
net to the insurance coverage across the land."' 251 Senator Kent Conrad
from North Dakota added that after his state had ordered parity, their
experience had been that "'it does not cost more money.' 252 He further
stated, "'[o]h, it does as you begin, but as you go forward, it does not cost
more money ... because, if you fail to treat [the mental disabilities], the
physical ailments mount and become much more expensive.'
253
Since 1996, many of the proponents of parity have cited figures that
would show that parity is achievable through a nominal increase. For
example, a 1998 study sponsored by the National Advisory Mental Health
Council Parity Workgroup, a division of the federal National Institute of
Mental Health, estimated that mental health parity would add less than one
percent to the cost of a health insurance policy of an HMO.254 In addition,
the Congressional Budget Office did a study and estimated that the Paul
Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2003 and its
predecessor, the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, would
increase health insurance premiums by 0.9%.255 Moreover, on August 1,
2001, the American Psychological Association retained
PricewaterhouseCoopers to do an analysis of the added cost for coverage
under the MHETA. It determined that mental health coverage on par with
physical health coverage will cost employers just one percent more, or
$1.32 per enrollee per month.256  Finally, the Office of Personnel
Management estimated that the implementation of parity under the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Program ("FEHBP"), which granted federal
employees mental health parity, increased plan premiums by 1.3%.257 This
figure is important because that Office, which administers the FEHBP, has
PROVISIONS FOR MEDICAL & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: AN ANALYSIS OF S.298, THE
"EQUITABLE HEALTH CARE FOR SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS ACT'"" 3 (Feb. 1996)) (unpublished
study, on file with the author of the law review article in which it was cited).
251. Id. at 90 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S3589 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Domenici)).
252. Id. (citing 142 CONG. REC. S3591 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Conrad)).
253. Id.
254. Merrill Matthews, Jr., Do We Need Mental Health Parity?, National Center for
Policy Analysis, No. 297, June 30, 1999 (on file with author).
255. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., COST ESTIMATE: S-543, MENTAL
HEALTH EQUITABLE TREATMENT ACT OF 2001 3 (August 22, 2001).
256. American Psychological Association, Mental Health Parity Coverage to Cost $1.32
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tangibly seen the costs associated with mental health parity.
In summary, it would seem that for somewhere around $16.00 more a
year, per person, an individual may receive the necessary care that is
needed if that person should develop a mental illness. As prevalent and
serious as some mental illnesses are, saving a mere $16.00 a year does not
seem to be a legitimate justification to limit mental health benefits.
D. Untreated/Under-treated Mental Illness Costs
It is interesting to note that although many insurers and employers are
concerned with the bottom line cost of parity, many may not fully realize or
comprehend the ultimate loss if parity is not achieved. Although mental
health parity will add minimally to plan premiums, the bigger cost
surrounds the way that mental health illness injures the operation of
businesses.
Untreated or under treated mental illnesses are truly costly to
businesses, government and families. Mental illnesses can affect a
worker's productivity and health just as much as physical illness. It adds to
costs by way of absenteeism, turnover expenses, poor morale, injury and
compensation costs, and conflict among employees.5 8 Overall, mental
illness has been estimated to cost the United States, which includes
businesses, governments and families, around $113 billion dollars
annually. 259 The National Mental Health Association's Labor Day 2001
Report found that the total cost for mental illness in both the private and
public sector is $205 billion, but less than half of that amount, $92 billion,
is spent on treatment.26 ° Untreated and under treated mental illnesses cost
$105 billion in lost productivity and $8 billion in costs from crime and
welfare.26'
In summary, legislative action seems to be the only viable solution to
provide mentally disabled individuals with the necessary protection from
the outright discrimination they face because the courts have failed to
protect them. Although the solution lies in the hands of Congress, it has
been, as discussed before, reluctant to move forward with a bill that would
258. See CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES ADMIN., BUSINESS MATERIALS FOR A MENTAL HEALTH-FRIENDLY WORKPLACE:
WORKPLACES THAT THRIVE: A RESOURCE FOR CREATING MENTAL HEALTH-FRIENDLY WORK
ENVIRONMENTS, SAMHSA Pub. No. P040478M (2004), available at
http://allmentalhealth.samhsa.gov/business resource.html (discussing the effect of mental
illness to work and the way to establish a mental health-friendly workplace).
259. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, LABOR DAY 2001 REPORT: UNTREATED
AND MISTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE COSTS U.S. $113 BILLION A
YEAR 2 (2001), available at http://www.nmha.org/pdfdocs/laborday2001.pdf.
260. 1d. at 3.
261. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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provide full parity for mentally disabled individuals, mainly because of the
cost. However, as demonstrated above, the cost is minimal and, in fact, it
would seem that untreated/under-treated costs pose a bigger problem.
Despite the failure to enact a bill for full parity, the passage of the
MHPA signaled that a majority of Congress is concerned and interested in
parity. Furthermore, the number of co-sponsors for the 2003 and 2005 Paul
Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act is encouraging.
However, for parity to be achieved one day, members of Congress must set
aside their various special interests and become more involved and resolute
to pass an all-encompassing bill.
VIII. CONCLUSION
On its face, the ADA states that no covered entity shall discriminate
against an individual with a disability because of that individual's disability
in regards to employment. 262 In addition, a long-term disability benefit plan
has been found to be included within the "terms, conditions, and other
privileges of employment" 263 language of the Act. Furthermore, the term
"discrimination", as Congress has stated, includes, "limiting, segregating,
or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such [individual] because of the disability."
'2 64
When an employer or carrier limits or caps the benefits an individual may
receive because that individual has a mental disability rather than a
physical one, this is a type of discrimination against individuals with
mental disabilities and an employer and/or insurance carrier should not be
able to differentiate between disabilities. However, it is quite evident that
the law has been interpreted to permit them to do so.
The heart of this article suggests that the ADA can and should be
interpreted to prohibit the disparity between mental and physical disability
benefits. This blatant discrimination against individuals with mental
disabilities must cease and the courts should interpret the statute to prevent
it. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Johnson, though vacated, provides a
more persuasive rationale than the Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits' narrow
interpretation of the statute. The Eleventh Circuit's expansive
interpretation of the committee reports is more appropriate as it fully
protects all individuals with disabilities. In addition, the Supreme Court
cases of Olmstead and O'Connor are more on point with this issue than
Traynor and Alexander. One could interpret the Supreme Court's holding,
that it is irrelevant who a person in a protected class has lost out to so long
he has lost out, as conclusive evidence that you cannot discriminate against
262. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2002).
263. Id. § 12112(a).
264. Id. §12112 (b)(1).
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persons within a protected class. 265 Individuals with mental and physical
disabilities are within the same protected class in that these individuals are
persons with disabilities. Thus, a fair reading of O 'Connor can stand for
the proposition that these individuals, regardless of their disability, should
be afforded the same protection and receive the same benefits. Employers
and insurance carriers can argue their technical statistics and cost/benefit
analysis figures, but the unequal treatment is discriminatory and must be
stopped.
Sadly, there is a realization that most of the courts of this country are
unwilling to deviate from the trend of interpreting the ADA to prohibit this
type of discrimination. Although some success has been achieved by
creating unique arguments and using alternative paths and claims, these
"victories" will only go so far, as insurance companies and employers will
draft "better" policies to limit the coverage.
Despite the trend that the court system has established, it is
encouraging to know that support is growing on other fronts. To begin
with, many members of Congress have been willing to look at the core of
the problem and take steps to stop this type of discrimination instead of
yielding to the interests of major corporations and insurance companies.
The introduction and re-introduction of congressional bills to provide equal
coverage for mental health benefits is reassuring. Hopefully, the call for
parity legislation will come to the forefront and Congress will ultimately
take steps to provide the full parity that mentally disabled persons so
desperately need. In addition, one can hope that the EEOC, with its recent
switch in position, will be propelled to issue a final manual that courts can
look to for guidance in ruling on these cases. These actions would re-focus
attention to the fact that disparity in mental health benefits is a type of
discrimination that needs to be remedied.
It is the hope that this article has provided both an overview and some
background surrounding mental health parity and the issues that are
preventing it. In researching this topic, it became apparent that there is
major support for mental health parity on the public opinion front. A 2004
national survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies for the Coalition
for Fairness in Mental Illness Coverage showed that seventy-eight percent
of Americans believe it is unfair for health insurance policies to routinely
limit mental health benefits and require people to pay more out-of-pocket
for mental health care than for any other medical care.266 This survey
demonstrates that immediate action needs to be taken to achieve absolute
parity.
265. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
266. Mental Health Parity Timeline, supra note 239.
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Mental illness has and will continue to affect people of all races,
colors, creeds, religions, genders, social status and income. Although long-
term disability benefit plans may discriminate against the mentally ill,
mental illness, when mental strikes, it will never discriminate against an
individual.
